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 Abstract  This chapter discusses some experiences of environmental pollution 
management in Japan. Cases include air pollution, water pollution, and toxic chemi-
cal regulation. From those experiences, it is concluded that in-process management 
of pollutants has been the major cause of pollutant reduction. End-of-pipe technolo-
gies, such as fl ue gas and wastewater treatment, are costly and not as effi cient as 
cleaner production processes. In addition, governmental policies in environmental 
management, such as setting regulatory values and guiding industries, sometimes 
lead industries to take ineffi cient countermeasures. Thus, regulating agencies should 
take care to ensure that their policy is leading society the right way and have the 
fl exibility to adapt their policy as necessary. 
 Keywords  End-of-pipe treatment •  In-process management •  Japanese experiences 
of environmental pollution •  Toxic chemical regulation 
14.1  Introduction 
 Japan’s economic development was very rapid during the 1960–1970s, when the 
country was recovering from the economy’s devastation as a result of World War II. 
As industrial development progressed, environmental pollution became evident and 
caused severe health damage to the people living around some industrial areas. These 
included four infamous cases of pollution-related health damage that resulted in 
major legal suits, namely, Minamata Disease around Minamata Bay in Kumamoto 
and Agano River in Niigata, Itai-Itai Disease on Jinzu River in Toyama, and 
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Yokkaichi Asthma around Yokkaichi petrochemical complex in Mie. In these cases, 
the national and local governments were afraid of inhibiting economic development 
and were at fi rst reluctant to take measures against the pollution and to compensate 
for the health damage. The victims therefore had to appeal to the courts to assert their 
rights. Indeed, the people affected by the pollution and the non-governmental groups 
that supported them played important roles in obtaining court decisions in favor of 
the victims, forcing the government and parliament to take countermeasures. 
 It has often been said that Japan successfully reduced pollution without hinder-
ing its economic growth. In my opinion, this statement is partially true, but not 
totally; there have been both merits and demerits in the way Japan acted. In this 
article, I would like to describe how the Japanese government and industries coped 
with the pollution problems and discuss what can be learned from Japanese experi-
ences both good and bad. 
14.2  How Pollution Loads Were Reduced 
14.2.1  Air Pollution in Yokkaichi Petrochemical Complex 
 A large scale petrochemical industrial complex commenced operations in Yokkaichi 
City around 1960. It contributed about one fourth of total Japanese petrochemical 
production value in the early 1960s. In 1961, however, people in the surrounding 
area started to complain of asthma and the situation reached its worst level around 
1963–1964. In those days, the sulfur content of heavy oil was about 3 % and the 
emission of sulfur oxides as SO 2 was about 130,000–140,000 tons/year (Study 
Group on Global Environmental Economics  1991 ). In the Isodu area south of the 
complex, about 3 % of the one-hour-average SO 2 concentration exceeded 0.5 ppm, 
which was 5 times higher than the current environmental standard, a one-hour- 
average concentration of 0.1 ppm. In 1967 the residents of the Isodu area, where the 
air pollution was most severe, appealed to the courts to stop the air pollution and to 
obtain compensation for their health damage. The courts acknowledged joint tort of 
the companies in the petrochemical complex and judged in favor of the plaintiffs. 
As a consequence, the following countermeasures were taken:
 1.  Introduction of environmental quality standards and stricter emissions regulation 
by the national government. The fi rst regulation of individual companies’ emis-
sion loads was introduced in Yokkaichi. 
 2.  Shift to heavy oil with lower sulfur content in the petrochemical industry. 
 3.  Construction of heavy oil desulfurization plants. 
 4.  Installation of fl ue gas desulfurization equipment in the petrochemical industry. 
 As a result of these measures, the targeted environmental standard for SO 2 was 
attained by 1976. Annual average SO 2 concentrations at monitoring stations in 
Yokkaichi are shown in Fig.  14.1 . Estimated emissions of SO 2 in the Yokkaichi area 
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were drastically reduced from 140,000 tons/year in 1964 to 100,000 in 1971 and to 
20,000 in 1975. After the late 1970s, gradual reduction continued. In contrast, fuel 
consumption in the area was relatively constant during the same period (about 
4 million kL/year) (Mie Prefecture  1990 ). This situation could be explained by the 
analysis for the whole of Japan undertaken by the Committee on Japan’s Experience 
in the Battle Against Air Pollution, as shown in Fig.  14.2 (Committee on Japan's 
Experience in the Battle Against Air Pollution  1997 ). This fi gure shows that fuel 
 Fig. 14.1  Annual sulfur dioxide concentrations at monitoring stations in Yokkaichi City (based on 
data from Yokkaichi City ( 2000 ,  2012 )) 
 Fig. 14.2  Contribution of different factors that reduced sulfur dioxide emissions in Japan 
(Committee on Japan’s Experience in the Battle Against Air Pollution  1997 ) 
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conversion (shift to oil of lower sulfur content and desulfurization of fuel) was the 
major cause of the reduction, followed by energy conservation. Flue gas desulfur-
ization made only a small contribution. This experience taught us that reduction at 
source is important and effective compared to end-of-pipe fl ue gas treatment.
 The petrochemical sector had to invest a considerable amount of money to achieve 
the reduction. Figure  14.3 shows the production of air pollution prevention devices 
in Japan. The fi rst installation peak appeared around 1974 and this corresponds to 
the rapid improvement of air quality discussed earlier in this section for the case of 
Yokkaichi. The largest amount of money was used for installation of fl ue-gas desul-
furization facilities, followed by dust-entrapping devices and oil desulfurization. It 
should be noted that investment in oil desulfurization facilities was minimal, but it 
was much more cost effective in terms of reducing emissions. However, to reduce 
emissions further, fl ue-gas desulfurization had to be installed. Overall, the most 
effective technology may vary according to the region and the nation’s economic 
situation; which technology to use therefore needs to be reconsidered in each indi-
vidual case. As a percentage of gross national product (GNP), investment in devices 
to prevent air pollution was nearly 0.25 % in 1974. This high number shows that 
Japan made quite a concentrated investment to counteract air pollution during the 
1970s. The second peak of investment in air pollution prevention devices occurred 
in the mid-1990s, twenty years later. This was when the facilities built in the 1970s 
were updated. The second peak was almost as high as the fi rst peak in terms of nomi-
nal value; however, the contribution to GNP was much smaller—dropping to as little 
as 0.07 %—due to the growth of GNP during the 20 years.
 Fig. 14.3  Actual production values of air pollution prevention devices ( bar graph ) and their con-
tributions to GNP ( line graph ) in Japan (FY1966–2004). Based on Statistics Japan (Statistics 




14.2.2  Preventing Water Pollution in the Pulp 
and Paper Industry 
 The total organic pollutant load in terms of biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) 
from domestic sewage was reduced from 750 thousand tons/year in 1970 to 580 
thousand tons/year in 1989 (Nakanishi  1994 ). This reduction was to only three- 
fourths of the original amount. In comparison, the total BOD discharged into public 
water bodies as wastewater from all Japanese industries was signifi cantly reduced to 
about one fi fteenth of its original value, from 3 million tons/year (in 1970) to 200 
thousand tons/year (in the late 1980s) (Fig.  14.4 ). As the organic pollutant load from 
the pulp and paper industry was quite large and contributed about half of the total 
BOD load from all industries, here we will discuss reduction of the wastewater 
organic pollutant load from the pulp and paper industry in particular.
 The organic pollutant load from the pulp and paper industry was about 2.2 mil-
lion tons/year in terms of chemical oxygen demand (COD) in 1970, and it was 
reduced to only 200 thousand tons/year in 1989. Assuming no reduction measures 
had been taken, however, it was estimated that it would have been 4.5 million tons/
year in 1989 based on the amount of pulp and paper production (Nakanishi  1994 ). 
The COD reduction was attained mainly by a product shift (58 %) and by black 
liquor recovery (26 %) (Fig.  14.5 ). The pulp and paper companies shifted their prod-
uct from pulp with high unit COD emission load to that of low unit emission load 
such as Kraft pulp. In addition, waste paper was used as a raw material in place of 
virgin pulp, which also reduced the emission load.
 Black liquor is the spent cooking liquor that is formed when pulpwood is digested 
into paper pulp by removing lignin, hemicelluloses, and other extractives from 
wood. This liquor contains a very high concentration of organic pollutants that are 
hard to remove by biological wastewater treatment processes. Thus, instead of dis-
charging black liquor to treatment plants or directly into water bodies, companies 
started to concentrate the liquor and burn it to recover heat energy to generate steam 
 Fig. 14.4  BOD loads and 
their contributions in Japan 
(Nakanishi  1994 ) 
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and cooking chemicals (sodium hydroxides and sodium sulfi de). This process 
change not only reduced the COD emission but was economically benefi cial in 
terms of energy and chemical use. 
 The third reduction measure was wastewater treatment, which contributed about 
16 % of the total reduction. It should be emphasized, however, that the reduction of 
waste load by improving the production process was much more effective and eco-
nomical than end-of-pipe wastewater treatment. In-process reduction also often 
saved raw materials and energy. 
 In contrast to industrial wastewater, domestic wastewater load cannot be reduced 
at the source but is instead reduced by municipal wastewater treatment plants or by 
small community-based sewage treatment systems. These sewage treatments are 
usually more expensive and take a longer time to implement than industrial waste-
water treatment measures as long sewer pipes have to be installed. 
14.2.3  Environmental Standards for Toxic Chemical 
Substances 
 As stated in the introduction section, Japan experienced some cases of environmen-
tal pollution that caused damage to human health. Because of those experiences, the 
Japanese government started to regulate a limited number of toxic pollutants that 
caused problems, such as mercury, cadmium, lead, and PCBs, by setting strict effl u-
ent standards (Table  14.1 ). As a result of these measures, rates of compliance with 
environmental water quality standards were signifi cantly improved during the 
1970s. The number of regulated pollutants in water did not change, however, for 
about 20 years until the 1990s. In 1993, fi fteen new substances including organo-
chlorines and pesticides were added to the items subject to the environmental qual-
ity standards. Three more items were added in 1999 and one item was added in 
2009. The reason that itemized regulation developed so slowly was that setting an 
 Fig. 14.5  Reduction of COD 
load in pulp and paper 




environmental standard for each item meant extensive and costly monitoring as well 
as control of emissions in a range of industrial sectors across the nation. It was 
therefore diffi cult to get support from all the sectors to add new items. Faced with 
the diffi culty of increasing the number of items subject to standards, in 1993 the 
Japanese government designated a group of chemicals that should be monitored 
(currently 26 items) and another group of chemicals that should be under observa-
tion (about 300 chemicals). Chemicals in these new groups are not yet regulated by 
the law but they are being monitored or information is being collected about them. 
Based on the information collected, new pollutants will be selected for inclusion 
among the items subject to environmental standards. This type of soft regulation 
gives warning to industry that, although some of the chemicals they use are not cur-
rently regulated, those chemicals should be used with care. Another mechanism that 
provides companies with an incentive to reduce their pollutant emissions is the pol-
lutant release and transfer register (PRTR) system, whereby companies are requested 
to report the amounts of listed pollutants they discharge into the environment or 
transfer to wastewater and solid waste treatment facilities.
14.2.4  Case of Administrative Guidance Relating 
to Toxic Chemicals 
 The chlor-alkali industry produces sodium hydroxide (caustic soda) and chlorine, as 
well as hydrogen, by electrolysis of sodium chloride solution. It is one of the key 
industries in the chemical sector. There are a few different methods, but the mercury 
cell process employing inorganic mercury was the main one used in Japan after 
World War II. 
 In 1956 the fi rst Minamata disease patient was offi cially identifi ed in the city of 
Minamata and in 1959 organic mercury was found to be the cause of the disease by 
Kumamoto University researchers. In 1965, a second case of Minamata disease was 
 Table 14.1  Items subject to water quality standards during the 1970s in Japan 
 Items  Standard (original value)  Year fi rst introduced (revised) 
 Cadmium  0.01 mg/L  1970 (2011: 0.01 → 0.003 mg/L) 
 Cyanide  ND  1970 
 Lead  0.1 mg/L  1970 (1993: 0.1 → 0.01 mg/L) 
 Hexavalent chromium  0.05 mg/L  1970 
 Arsenic  0.05 mg/L  1970 (1993: 0.05 → 0.01 mg/L) 
 Total mercury  0.0005 mg/L  1970 
 Alkyl mercury  ND  1970 
 Organophosphate  ND  1970 (1993: deleted from the list) 
 PCB  ND  1975 
 ND Should not be detected 
 The number of items regulated for protection of human health is currently 27 
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identifi ed in the downstream area of Agano River. In both cases, discharge of 
organic mercury from the acetaldehyde production process, rather than the chlor- 
alkali production process, was offi cially confi rmed as the cause of the disease by the 
national government in 1968. 
 However, mercury was also emitted from the chlor-alkali production process, 
which was linked to a third case of Minamata disease reported in the Ariake Sea 
area in 1973. This case in particular caused great fear among the Japanese public, 
although the link with chlor-alkali production was later disproved. As a result of the 
public outcry, in June 1973 the Japanese government decided to minimize mercury 
loss from the mercury cell process by introducing a closed system. In addition, it 
decided in November 1973 that one third of Japan’s mercury cell operations would 
be converted to the diaphragm cell process by September 1975, with the remainder 
to be converted by March 1978. Although at that time it had not been established 
that inorganic mercury could be transformed into organic mercury in the environ-
ment, a committee appointed by the government had submitted a report saying that 
the mercury problem would not be solved without totally phasing out the mercury 
cell process. Consequently the Japanese government made the drastic decision of 
ordering the chlor-alkali industry to change their production process. 
 Following the emergence of the chlor-alkali industry in the 1920s, the production 
capacity of the mercury cell and diaphragm cell processes became comparable 
 during the 1930s. This situation continued until the mid-1950s, when demand for 
high quality sodium hydroxide increased. The mercury cell process could pro-
duce better quality sodium hydroxide, but mercury was expensive; the diaphragm 
cell process, on the other hand, produced an inferior quality product, but without the 
need for mercury. When the Japanese chlor-alkali industry was converting its mer-
cury cell operations to diaphragm cell operations, it became evident that the sodium 
hydroxide produced by the diaphragm cell process contained about 1 % sodium 
chloride and other impurities such as sodium chlorate. This made it unusable for the 
production of chemical fi ber, cellophane, inorganic chemicals and so on, which 
account for about 25 % of total sodium hydroxide demand (Kameyama  2008 ). Its 
chlorine gas was not suitable as a raw material for products such as vinyl chloride, 
which account for 41 % of total demand (Kameyama  2008 ). In addition, the prices 
of diaphragm cell products were expected to be 40 % more expensive than those of 
mercury cell products. To promote conversion from one process to the other, there-
fore, the Japanese government had to align the prices of corresponding products 
from the two processes by introducing a system for paying the price difference. The 
resulting lack of incentive to innovate was not favorable considering that interna-
tional competition and innovative technology were desired. 
 Subsequently, following the appearance of an innovative ion-exchange mem-
brane cell process developed by Asahi Glass Co., completion of the conversion 
plan’s second stage was postponed to await confi rmation of the applicability of the 
innovative technology. The new process, which could produce better quality prod-
ucts with high energy effi ciency, was adopted instead, and accounted for 60 % of 
Japan’s production capacity in 1987 and 100 % in 2005. This process of transition 
within the chlor-alkali industry is shown in Fig.  14.6 .
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 The conversion between processes in Japan’s chlor-alkali industry was a peculiar 
case, but it was instructive. The Japanese government had been compelled to take 
quite a precautionary policy after Minamata disease had such a large impact on 
society. However, its administrative guidance confl icted with economic principles 
and could not be adopted by the industry without a price adjustment system. The 
chlor-alkali industry had to waste a signifi cant amount of money to change their 
process fi rst from mercury cell to diaphragm cell, and then to the membrane cell 
process. The Japan Soda Industry Association estimated that the chlor-alkali indus-
try invested about 10 years-worth of benefi t for the process conversion in 1978 
alone (Nakanishi  1995 ). In fact, the closed-system mercury process reduced mer-
cury loss from 114 to 2.3 g per ton of sodium hydroxide production and, with hind-
sight, was good enough to bridge the time-gap until the membrane process emerged 
(Kameyama  2008 ). Delaying the transition would have been much more cost effi -
cient. On the other hand, it can be said that without the government order, the indus-
try might not have worked hard enough to develop an innovative technology in such 
a short period. 
 It is likely that the Japanese chlor-alkali industry could bear the high cost of 
process change in the 1970s and 1980s because they faced less pressure from for-
eign countries’ imports than is the case now that world trade is more open. It is 
becoming increasingly diffi cult for industries to bear the increase in costs for better 
environmental management if a similar degree of management is not required in 
other countries. At any rate, management policies should be readjusted to fi t the 
current situation so that both environmental protection and economic development 
can progress. 
 Fig. 14.6  Transitions in chlor-alkali processes in Japan (Ministry of the Environment and Japan 
 2011 ) 
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14.3  Conclusion: Lessons from the Japanese Experience 
 This chapter introduced some examples of environmental pollution and associated 
countermeasures in Japan. Successful pollution reductions are often achieved by 
in-process technological innovation and efforts, not by wastewater or fl ue gas treat-
ment. In-process pollution reductions are referred to as “cleaner production,” and 
are often much more economical than end-of-pipe treatment. In addition, wise water 
use, such as recycling and counter fl ow washing, contributes to raising the concen-
tration of pollutants in the water and making treatment more effi cient. Perhaps the 
key lesson to be drawn from the Japanese experience, however, is that governmental 
regulation and guidance should be introduced carefully and adaptively. 
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